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Masculinity has always occupied a central position in Afghan culture and identity. Historically  
it has expressed itself through the designation of female behaviour as standards by which to  
judge male honour and social status. Under the Taliban, women were perceived as inferior  
and their  status as rights-bearers was continuously challenged. The rights of women are  
further  imperilled  by  the crisis  in  male  masculinity  that  has  resulted  from the  protracted  
episodes of  male-targeted violence.  At  present,  with  the Taliban ousted and Afghanistan 
undergoing a period of reconstruction, it is important to consider how Afghan men will attempt  
to reassert their masculinity after a long period of extreme violence and oppression, and how 
such practices may impinge on the human rights of women within Afghanistan. This paper 
argues that because traditional means by which masculinity is asserted in most societies  
have  been  rendered  virtually  devastated  or  severely  restricted  by  the  long  episodes  of 
conflict,  men will  attempt  to  reclaim their  masculinity  through the use of  violence.  Using  
traditional theories of masculinity, the article argues that remasculinisation in Afghanistan will  
occur through the use of violence, particularly in the private sphere, where women will often  
become the most accessible targets.
Introduction
Reconstruction in Afghanistan is progressing gradually amidst continued threats of insurgency and 
acts of violence. Along with this slow period of economic and social reform, Afghans are also left with the 
task  of  reaffirming  or  reconstituting  their  national  identity,  an  undertaking  that  has  progressed  in  a 
piecemeal fashion throughout Afghan history. In the past, tribal affinities and inter-ethnic conflicts have 
often threatened Afghanistan, virtually obliterating any possibility of forging a cohesive national identity. 
Despite a historical tendency to shy away from the idea of a unified Afghan national identity there is much 
evidence to support the idea that there is a sense of belonging and of being distinctly Afghan among the 
majority of people in this country. Hence, as Nancy Dupree argues, feelings of national solidarity and 
identity do, in fact, exist in Afghanistan (Dupree, 2002: 978). Dupree suggests that this sense of identity 
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focuses on the idea of a unique Afghan culture. As such, in a bid to bridge the chasm between the various 
tribes and religious factions it can be maintained that future heads of State in Afghanistan may attempt to 
reinstitute  highly  patriarchal  family  practices  emphasising the  more  salient  aspects  of  Afghan  culture 
(Moghadam,  2005:  66).1 In  the  past,  such  practices  have  left  women  extremely  vulnerable  as  such 
constructions  of  masculinity  and  femininity  tend  to  normalise  or  naturalise  violence  against  women 
(Moghadam, 2005:63). 
Although Afghanistan has historically gone through periods where the preservation of women’s rights 
were seen as important objectives of the State, and respect and reverence of women were historically 
considered  an  important  aspect  of  Afghan  culture,  it  can  certainly  be  argued  that  the  political 
circumstances of the last two decades have redefined Afghan masculinity as one that inherently involves 
female-targeted violence.   The hypermasculinity of  the Taliban regime (hypermasculine because their 
concept  of  masculinity  required  the  complete  removal  of  women from the public  sphere,  as  well  as 
severely restricted women’s rights in the private sphere) has reformulated the question of what it means to 
be a man in Afghanistan. In essence, for at least the last two decades ‘being a man’ in the Afghan context 
has almost  always involved the threat  and use of  violence,  where women have been most often the 
primary targets.
Masculinity has occupied an important position within Afghan identity even prior to the emergence of 
the Taliban, often in the form of male honour, social status and male authoritativeness. These symbols of 
masculinity bridge the gulf between various tribal and ethnic affinities, and present views and ideas very 
common among Afghan men. Historically, this attraction for maintaining masculinity through a patriarchal 
society,  where  women  are  considered  subordinate  to  men,  has  led  to  the  disintegration  of  many 
governments that desired to give women’s rights the place and respect that it deserves and has received 
internationally (Moghadam, 2002: 22).   
Some have suggested that perhaps the most prominent cultural trait that unites all Afghans is belief in 
the concept of honour as central to Afghani life and society (Dupree, 2002: 978); and women are very 
much bound up in the concept of honour in this society.  In Afghanistan, women are frequently considered 
the “standards by which morality is judged, and they carry the responsibility of passing on the values of 
the society to younger generations” (Dupree, 2002: 978). Hence, Afghans see limitations on the practices 
of women as a necessary evil meant to safeguard social status and honour. By extension, one can also 
make the argument that male masculinity is reinforced by this added power of men in Afghan society to 
restrict or limit the actions of women based on what men consider appropriate and honourable behaviour. 
Dishonourable female behaviour can be seen as symbolic of a male’s (be it her husband, father, brother) 
inability to exercise adequate authority and power. A society that measures the social and moral worth of 
men  by  the  behaviour  of  the  women  in  their  lives  undoubtedly  illustrates  the  central  position  that 
1  This method of fostering national support was utilised by Saddam Hussein in Iraq during his reign.
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conceptions of masculinity occupy within this society.
Although more international  media coverage and zeal  has been devoted to the plight  of  Afghan 
women during the rule of the Taliban, it is important to note that Afghan men were also frequently made 
targets of Taliban-initiated violence. In a culture where men are constructed as being vital to the public 
sphere, and the capacity to govern is considered a measure of manhood, the extreme experiences of 
violence coupled with  the near  inability  of  the majority  of  Afghan men to be involved in  the political 
process, has resulted in eroding feelings of masculinity among Afghan men. As a result, as this paper 
argues, since Afghan society has traditionally been very patriarchal,  the cultivation of national identity 
during this process of transition to democracy will largely depend on how Afghan men will reclaim their 
masculinity during this period of relative independence. This presents a further challenge to the rights of 
women in  Afghanistan.  I  argue  that  because  traditional  means by which  masculinity  is  asserted  are 
virtually absent or severely restricted within Afghanistan, men will reassert their masculinity through the 
only means they have observed to be effective in at least the last two decades – violence. This, I argue, at 
least in the private sphere, will most often take the form of violence directed against women. 
Much research has focused on exploring transitional justice from feminist perspectives; and many 
studies have concluded that theories and processes of  transitional  justice fail  to address or take into 
account the role and experiences of women (Bell & O’Rourke, 2007: 23). However, there has been little 
research  done  on  the  remasculinisation  of  men  post  conflict.   Examining  the  move  away  from 
emasculation to remasculinisation – from the point where conflict is contained, to the point where a nation 
begins the transition to  democracy and the rule  of  law – can be particularly helpful  in  adding to the 
literature already available on the dilemmas facing women during the transitional process. The methods 
by which men may attempt to reclaim their masculinity after a conflict may result in dire consequences for 
the continued respect for and protection of women’s rights within that particular community. 
The situation in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban regime presents a rare glimpse into the many 
different dilemmas men can face during conflict and how that translates into ideas of manhood once that 
conflict  subsides.  Given  the  social  and  political  circumstances  that  prevail  in  Afghanistan,  Afghan 
communities  are  missing  the  traditional  institutions  -  such  as  education  or  employment  -  by  which 
masculinity is asserted in other societies.  Accordingly, in the face of this absence, I argue that Afghani 
men will  reclaim their masculinity through the use of violence.2 This violence will  manifest itself  in two 
2  Violence has been described as a normalized means by which to solve conflict in most societies (Kaufmann, 1987: 
5-9).   Indeed, researchers have also maintained that, in particular, men in most societies have been taught to use 
violence as a method of conflict resolution in situations where they feel powerless or vulnerable. This is one of the 
reasons why men are, more often than not, the primary participants in violence in the home, schoolyard and streets. 
Essentially, violence is very much a part of constructions of masculinity (Kaufmann, 1997: 30-37). However, men in 
Afghanistan will  be more likely to resort to violent means of renegotiating their masculinity because it  is the only 
method of successfully attaining power that Afghan society has bore witness to for at least two decades. Furthermore, 
female-targeted violence is also more immanent in Afghanistan because of the highly patriarchal  structure of  the 
society. The inherent need to resort to violence to reassert masculinity by men’s feelings of powerlessness, the fact 
that violence has been seen as the only means of successfully asserting authority and power for the last twenty years, 
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possible forms, which I refer to as public and private, or political and domestic. 
The  first  part  of  this  paper  discusses  some  of  the  most  prominent  theories  of  masculinisation, 
outlining the common or traditional methods by which masculinity is often asserted in most societies. This 
section also illustrates why I believe that Afghans may have an attraction to violence as a method by 
which to assert masculinity. Secondly, this analysis demonstrates how masculinisation utilising traditional 
methods  –  employment,  educative  institutions  and  familial  relationships  -  are  either  impractical  or 
impossible for Afghan men given the political and social realities present within the state.  I argue that 
violence may be a more probable method of remasculinisation, namely that a strong case for it exists 
based on Afghan history and the sex/gender system adopted by Afghani society. Lastly, this examination 
attempts to highlight some of the key challenges that this example of post-conflict remasculinisation may 
pose for Afghan women and women’s rights in Afghanistan.
Theories of Masculinisation
The concept of traditional masculinity has been developed by several sociological and psychological 
theories. One theory attempts to differentiate between male and female using the “sex/gender system”, 
which can be described as configurations of social relations centred on reproduction and gender division. 
These configurations, although present in all societies, may vary according to the society’s demographics 
and  history  (Carrigan  et.  al,  2002:  111).  Two  particular  aspects  of  this  system  that  have  received 
considerable attention have been - the division of labour and the structure of power or sexual politics. 
Lying at  the  crux of  both  these frameworks  is  the subordination of  women.  Thus,  it  has  often  been 
suggested that the most central feature of masculinity in general is that it empowers men through the 
subordination of women (Carrigan et. al., 2002: 111).  Many authors suggest that research on this subject 
should not focus on masculinity, in the singular, but rather – masculinities (Carrigan et. al., 2002: 112), all 
hierarchically subordinate to the overarching “hegemonic masculinity” (representing the culturally idealised 
form of masculinity), which has the ability to enforce a particular definition on all other kinds of masculinity 
(Carrigan et. al., 2002: 112).  Hence, masculinities exist in hierarchical relationships, with the hegemonic 
masculinity being the most admired and dominant of them all. For most societies this would include an 
image  of  masculinity  as  aggressive,  authoritative,  courageous  and  heterosexual.  The  differential 
masculinities are considered both psychological, meaning that it affects the types of people men are and 
become, as well as institutional, achieved through collective practice (Carrigan et. al., 2002: 112).3  This 
and because Afghanistan represents a highly patriarchal society where women are constantly seen as subordinate to 
men,  male-instituted  violence  is  more  likely  than  not  to  be  the  most  prominent  manner  in  which  masculinity  is 
reasserted after the fall of the Taliban and Afghanistan’s transition to democracy. 
3 The authors give the example of the British Printing workers as a group that institutionalized masculinity through 
collective practices. The authors maintain that the compositor’s work remains hypermasculine due to practices of 
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suggests that although there is no one model of masculinity that every man within a society adopts, the 
hegemonic masculinity model has the tendency to override and impose certain restrictions on all other 
forms of masculinity that may appear in a particular society. In the Afghan context, this theory supports the 
idea of agency – in that Afghan men are able to develop and define masculinity for themselves, however 
there continues to exist an overarching idea of manhood that imposes on other masculinities ideas which 
may subordinate women and support violence. Social definitions of masculinity are, thus, extensions of 
ideas embedded both within the dynamics of institutions, such as the state, corporations, unions and 
families, as well as an extension of ideas espoused by individuals. It would be reasonable to assume that 
if one particular masculinity model, say one that holds violence as central to conceptions of manhood, is 
institutionalised  through  decades  of  practice  within  any  given  society,  it  would  eventually  become 
normalised, and would therefore become part of that society’s hegemonic masculinity model. 
Despite the potency of hegemonic masculinity models it has been suggested that these frameworks 
are actually quite fluid and often open for reconstruction. Features that may make up a society’s model of 
hegemonic masculinity at one point may not do so at some other point in time. In order to illustrate this 
shift in hegemonic masculinity, one can examine the frequent expression of masculinity through warfare. 
Many feminist theorists suggest that war is often described as being inherently masculine, in that men are 
most often the dominant actors, and that warfare is seen as a practice that protects where men protect the 
motherland – creating a bifurcation between masculine and feminine - from intrusion (Charlesworth and 
Chinkin, 2000: 128-130).  The fact that some societies develop different methods of warfare, for example 
‘war proper’ as opposed to ‘terrorism’, may be indicative of the fact that each holds a different model of 
masculinity.  In the society that engages in ‘terrorism’ as a method of warfare, masculinity involves an 
individual’s  willingness  to  annihilate  oneself  in  the  process.   However,  many  states  have  shown  a 
propensity for different methods of warfare throughout time, which indicates that conceptions of manhood 
and  masculinity  are  fluid  and  can  change.  Hence,  although  violence  may  be  very  much  part  of  a 
masculinity model at present, it is possible to restructure such models so that violence is eventually not 
seen as masculinising. 
Although  masculinity  models  are  open  to  reconstruction  and  depend on  the  social  and  political 
particularities  of  a  any  given  society  (Haywood  and  Mac  an  Ghaill,  2003:  85),  sociologists  have 
established a set of contexts within which most men develop their masculinity irrespective of their differing 
cultures or ethnicities. Traditional methods of asserting masculinity are said to occur within the sphere of 
work/employment, education, and familial relationships4 (Haywood and Mac an Ghaill, 2003: 19-39, 42-55, 
driving women out of the trade, marginalizing related labour and processes in which they continued to work, and by 
maintaining a strong masculine “culture” within the workplace.
4   Although it can certainly be argued that the role of these institutions in asserting and constructing masculinity are 
culturally specific, apart from perhaps education, employment and familial relationships are most certainly spheres 
where the role of men and women are quite observable as being different and distinct regardless of what culture one 
belongs to. Women have traditionally been seen as primary caregivers based on their capacity to bear children and 
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62-79). It is believed that self-identity, and by extension masculinity, is only open to reconstruction when it 
seems to be in  crisis  and the previously  believed stability  of  the framework  is  replaced by doubt  or 
uncertainty (Haywood and Mac an Ghaill,  2003:  14).  Examination of  Afghanistan’s social  and political 
conditions clearly demonstrates that  these traditional  institutions by which masculinity is  asserted are 
either not present or are severely restricted.  Experiences of decades of extreme violence, and civil and 
political unrest - where death has become very unpredictable and state-instituted violence seems arbitrary 
– has led to a situation where masculinity is continuously being challenged and oppressed.
Violence has become a common attribute  of  Afghan political  culture.  Afghanistan emerged as a 
nation  in  the  late  eighteenth  century,  ruled  by  a  succession  of  monarchs,  though  their  power  was 
constantly  undermined by civil  wars  and foreign invasions.  The state’s  current  borders  were  defined 
through a game of rivalry between Russia and Britain, resulting in much of Afghan foreign policy being 
influenced by powers outside the State. From 1973 to the present time, the Afghan people have lived 
through  continuous  civil  wars,  their  rulers  continuously  being  overthrown  by  a  coup  or  executed  by 
fundamentalists  (‘Afghanistan  and  the  United  Nations,'  2008).5 The  perpetual  violence  has  had 
devastating effects on the people of Afghanistan. Almost a million Afghans have perished as a result of the 
continuous conflict (Grenfell, 2004: 506).  Over three million Afghans have been displaced, many fleeing to 
Pakistan and Iran for refuge after the turmoil in the eighties and nineties (Grenfell, 2004: 506). With the 
Taliban regime in power, human security was further limited as Afghans were forced to adhere to strict 
Shari’a  law erected by the fundamentalist regime, resulting in severe forms of punishment which often 
involved  stoning  men  and  women  to  death  for  adultery,  and  cutting  off  their  hands  for  thievery 
(Revolutionary Association of Women of Afghanistan, 2008).  Exercising power and authority within the political 
sphere, an area where men have traditionally been seen as dominant, has become synonymous with the 
practice  of  violence.  Measures  of  masculinity  have  become  linked  with  practices  of  brutality  and 
aggression. 
In  comparison  to  reports  about  violence  against  women,  the  oppression  of  men  in  Taliban-led 
Afghanistan has attracted less media attention.  While the Taliban were in power, Afghan men very rarely 
epitomized the commonly accepted images associated with masculinity – men as courageous, strong, 
daring and rational (Kaufmann, 1987: 3).6  Threats of death became prevalent under Taliban rule as men 
their ‘maternal’ instincts, while men’s productivity tends to be restricted to wage-earning employment. Men’s role as 
‘heads of household’ is augmented by their dominance as wage-earners or ‘breadwinners’ in most societies. It is 
undeniable that men generally, in most patriarchal societies, have “traditionally escaped domestic labour, an on 
average […] have higher wages, better jobs…” (Kaufmann, 1987: 8-9).  Educative institutions have also been 
included in my analysis because it is a significant means by which gender roles are cemented in any society, hence it 
can  be considered an important institution in the overall construction of gender and ‘making of masculinity’ (Haywood 
and Mac an Ghaill, 2003: 63-80).   
5  Also, when the Taliban came into power, they executed both the Communist leader, Dr. Najibullah, as well as all his 
brothers. 
6 Although it may be argued that gender and masculinity are socially constructed conceptions, and therefore culturally 
specific, some theorists have discussed the possibility that conceptions of gender can be reduced to anthropology and 
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were often arrested arbitrarily, humiliated through public flogging and brutality, and sometimes executed 
for the most minute of infractions (Human Rights Watch, 2008; Gadoury, 2001: 391-415).  At times, it 
seemed that  being  a  man in  Afghanistan  seemed to  offer  little  more  security  than  being  a  woman. 
Furthermore, if execution by the Taliban was not an imminent threat, death or disfigurement by landmines 
certainly was.  Afghanistan has the largest concentration of landmines worldwide (Center for Economic 
and Social Rights, 2008), with over 700 square kilometres of still-contaminated land (United Nations Office 
on Drugs and Crime, 2002).  The spontaneity, randomness and complete unpredictability of death instilled a 
sense of perpetual fear and terror in Afghan males.  The arbitrariness of death also threatened the role of 
men  as  protectors  of  their  families,  particularly  protectors  of  the  women  in  their  lives.  Women  that 
challenged  the  idealised  model  of  femininity,  as  virtually  invisible  and  intellectually  and  politically 
subservient, were made targets of cruel practices of brutality that often resulted in death. Defending social 
status and male honour was no longer considered a right of male relatives, but appropriated by the Taliban 
in their bid to create the ideal Islamic state. Essentially, for at least the last ten years, “being a man” in 
Afghanistan meant that you had to seize and maintain power by resorting to violence and subordinating 
women. 
As Afghanistan now makes the transition to democracy, Afghan men have been able to exercise a 
greater  capacity  for  participation  in  the  political  sphere,  an  area  that  is  generally  considered  to  be 
masculine. Clausewitz presented a particularly interesting conception of masculinity in On War, claiming 
that de-masculinisation post-conflict occurs mostly as a result of humiliation and loss of male honour, both 
of which must be avenged and redeemed through acts of war (Dudink et. al, 2004: 4).  Later sociological 
theorists, on the other hand, claim that masculinity may be asserted nonviolently outside the context of 
war, essentially through familial relationships, education and employment (Haywood and Mac an Ghaill, 
2003: 85).  However, I argue that since traditional institutions of family, education and employment do not 
exist, or exist in a limited capacity, current social circumstances in Afghanistan do not allow men to reclaim 
their masculinity without resorting to excessive violence.  Accordingly, Afghan men must seek out other 
methods by which to remasculinise. Judging from their political history, these methods will likely involve 
some form of violence, be it public as in the context of war or other forms of conflict, or in the private 
sphere where women often become targets.
Absence of or Restrictions on Traditional Methods of Asserting Masculinity
In Afghan society, it is generally agreed that men are meant to be the primary wage earners, while 
male physiology. Goldberg asserts that an inherent disposition towards hierarchy compels men to engage in those 
behaviours that will guarantee their domination in male-female relationships (Goldberg, 1975: 70). As such, if there is 
such a conception of “universal female subordination” (Lee and Daly, 1987: 30) then the construction of masculinity is 
quite similar in most societies. 
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women are considered the primary caregivers and homemakers (Shalinsky, 1986: 324). Of course the 
confinement of women to the private sphere was further compounded by the numerous restrictions placed 
by the Taliban on the ability of Afghan women to be productive outside the home. Regardless, given the 
current  political  and  social  realities  in  Afghanistan,  observance  of  these  traditional  gender  roles  has 
become extremely problematic.  Formal regulated employment outside the home is scarce, and although 
zero percent of Afghan women stated employment as their top human rights concern, work most certainly 
was a concern for at least 14% of Afghan men (Center for Economic and Social Rights, 2002).  Despite 
these statistics, women’s organisations that have moved into the state have been industriously providing 
women with increased opportunities to participate in the work force, but have done very little by way of 
providing the same opportunities for men. This has resulted in a great deal of resentment among Afghan 
men (Abirafeh, 2007: 8-9).  Masculinity is most definitely threatened under these conditions as traditional 
gender  roles become reversed and men are  considered less important  contributors  to  the economic 
successes of the family.  One particularly interesting illustration of how men are attempting to challenge 
this threat to their masculinity is by their efforts to preserve their sense of pride by refusing food assistance 
despite having concerns about family income (Center for Economic and Social Rights, 2002).  With the 
added assistance of women’s aid organisations that have moved into the country, women are more readily 
becoming the ‘head of households’ as they acquire the position of primary breadwinners. International 
initiatives make it harder for men to assert a role they have historically become accustomed to, in part 
because women are given special attention and treatment.  As employment is scarce, and men more 
frequently  find  themselves  in  the  role  of  homemaker,  rather  than  primary  breadwinner,  masculinity 
becomes threatened by women who are now appropriating traditionally male roles.  Hence, employment in 
Afghanistan seems to be a site where men are further emasculated, rather than a site where masculinity 
can be championed.
Another  means  by  which  masculinisation  traditionally  occurs  is  through  educational  practices. 
Schools provide perhaps the most  significant  environment within  which gender roles are established; 
“schooling processes  form gendered  identities,  marking  out  ‘correct’  or  ‘appropriate’ styles  of  being.” 
(Haywood and Mac an Ghaill,  2003: 63).  Although the Taliban had very little interest in educating the 
people of Afghanistan, in a recent study 12% of Afghans consider education the top priority for human 
rights initiatives within the country (Center for Economic and Social Rights, 2002).  When not ranked in 
terms of importance, respondents chose education as a human rights concern more frequently than any 
other concern, at 24% of the time (Center for Economic and Social Rights, 2002).  Although the right to 
education has vastly improved in comparison to when the Taliban was in power, many Afghan children 
cannot access basic education.  Almost  all  children residing in rural  areas have no access to schools 
(Human Rights Watch, 2006).  
Access to education in urban areas has also been tenuous.  In the years after the fall of the Taliban 
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regime, terrorism was very much a cause for concern in Afghanistan.  Since oppositional groups often 
made teachers and students targets of violence, almost 100,000 students that were previously attending 
school in 2005 remained home in 2006 (Human Rights Watch, 2006).  Teachers and students endured at 
least 200 attacks perpetrated by warlords and insurgent groups in the country between 2005 and 2006, 
and at least seventeen teachers and educational officials were assassinated during the same time frame 
(Human Rights Watch, 2006).  Direct attacks on schools destroyed infrastructure and forced these schools 
to shut down.  Increased shutdowns resulted in a ‘ripple effect’, causing other schools in the vicinity to do 
the same out of fear that they may become the next targets (Human Rights Watch, 2006).  Although 
women were barred from education by the Taliban and only men were considered rational and capable 
enough to be worthy of educating, the virtual absence of schools during this time effectively guaranteed 
that men were unable to live up to these characterisations of masculinity. 
Although the ousting of  the Taliban has resulted in over 5.8 million children being able to attend 
school (Straziuso, 2008), the fact that education was historically developed as a domain to be accessed 
only by men, and the fact that the majority of the students now attending schools are women, continues to 
pose  problems  for  education-related  masculinisation  in  Afghanistan.  Traditionally,  Afghan  culture  has 
depicted men as more rational than women, and therefore more competent in matters of knowledge and 
learning. Allowing women access to education challenges this presumption and causes further crises in 
masculinity in a society that generally believes women to be irrational and feeble-minded.  Balancing the 
functions and responsibilities of women with that of men may be perceived as assaulting the sensibilities 
of a society that has historically been extremely patriarchal.  Additionally, because schools are virtually 
inaccessible to the majority of Afghan men living in rural areas, there exists little by way of establishments 
that institutionalise traditional gender roles. Perhaps for some rights activists this may be considered a 
positive consequence of  being unable to access educational  institutions, particularly for a society that 
should aim to prevent any cementing of societal norms which may put women in an inferior position. 
Nonetheless, the inability of males to assert their masculinity through school-instituted gender norms may 
mean that more aggressive methods of masculinisation may be pursued.  As such, not having access to 
schools may, particularly in societies that have shown a propensity for resorting to violence, prove to be 
more detrimental to the rights of women.
The  traditional  family  in  most  Western  societies  used  to  consist  of  a  male  breadwinner,  whose 
principal  task  was  to  work  outside  the  home  and  earn  enough  to  support  his  family,  and  a  female 
homemaker, whose primary task was to manage the home and look after the children.  However, late 
modernity has brought with it many challenges to the traditional family unit. In particular, the distinctions 
between male and female roles are less pronounced. Women are increasingly entering the workforce, 
while males are more often assuming the roles traditionally assigned to women. The ability of women to 
juggle both sets of roles, those of the private realm (the home) and those of the public realm (work), has 
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led to a disintegration of standard gender roles. The responsibility of the man as breadwinner and father 
has been shattered by the ability of women to manage both roles, that of caretaker, as well as that of 
wage earner – which begs the question “do we need fathers at all?” (Haywood and Mac an Ghaill, 2003: 
43).  The imposition of such standards on societies that have historically adopted a framework centred on 
the idea of men and women having very distinct and different functions in society may be considered a 
threat to that society’s model of masculinity. 
The family unit is extremely important in Afghan culture. Afghans do not consider human rights as 
individual  entitlements;  rather,  they  understand  such  rights  from  a  family  or  community  perspective 
(Center  for  Economic  and  Social  Rights,  2002:  23).   Although  the  family  is  considered  an  integral 
component of Afghan identity,  emerging issues have destabilised familial  relationships, and have thus 
been perceived as a threat to male masculinity.  The traditional view of the family, an institution within 
which men assert their  masculinity through non-violent means – such as disciplinarian, protector,  and 
primary wage earner – has become endangered by both the constant and arbitrary demonstrations of 
political violence, as well as the influx of various rights organisations.
Working in the public sphere allowed men to develop a “patriarchal, authoritarian masculinity within 
the home” (Haywood and Mac an Ghaill, 2003: 43).  However, with the inability of Afghan men to acquire 
employment, the prerequisites for developing this level of masculinity can no longer be acquired.  Men’s 
participation in the family unit, as well as their image as the powerful ‘father’ and ‘husband’, is further 
threatened by a reconstitution of gender roles, where women are viewed as new ‘heads of household’ by 
virtue of their earning potential.  This new image of the ‘father’ as “pitiable, marginal” (Haywood and Mac 
an Ghaill, 2003: 45) and inferior to the mother serves to further emasculate Afghan men and delegitimises 
their authority within the family unit. 
Along with this inability to develop authoritarian masculinities in the home, remasculinisation in the 
Afghan context becomes further impeded by the extreme violence prevalent in the country, which renders 
the family unit vulnerable and susceptible to destruction.  Traditional images of the ‘father’ envision him as 
‘protector’ of the family. However, the inability of Afghan men to curb the excessive political violence ever-
present in Afghan society most definitely compromises his function as ‘defender and protector’ of  the 
family. 
Moreover, the human rights organisations and activists flooding the country are appropriating the role 
of  fathers  as  primary  teachers  of  morality.  Media  and  activists  are  continually  imposing  upon  the 
population new ideological models which emphasise equalising the rights of women and which are often 
perceived  as  reflecting  Western  rhetoric  and  foreign  values.  Disciplining  of  women  and  children, 
traditionally a matter left in the hands of the male head-of-household, is being severely restricted by the 
myriad human rights organisations moving into the country. This is, of course, not to say that the respect 
for women and the rule of law is inappropriate or wrong, but that such impositions result in crises in self-
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identity among the men and women that  comprise a patriarchal  society,  where men and women are 
ordered hierarchically.  By assuming responsibilities that  were traditionally fulfilled by the father figure, 
these organisations are threatening the traditional family unit in Afghan society. 
Despite  concerns  with  family,  education  and  employment,  a  relative  majority  (40%)  of  Afghans 
considered peace and security the top human rights concern (Center for Economic and Social Rights, 
2002: 23).  Even if one was to argue that the traditional means of asserting one’s masculinity were very 
much available in Afghanistan, the instability caused by the lack of peace and security, and the constant 
fear of death would most certainly undercut the existence of these institutions. The threat and use of 
violence, whether by occupying forces, militants or insurgents, has become an every day occurrence for 
Afghans. Judith Butler suggests that societies that are exposed to long periods of violence, coupled with 
the  periods  of  mourning that  frequently  go  along with  it,  often  find a  “basis  for  community  in  these 
conditions” as a result of our sheer level of human vulnerability to such circumstances (Butler, 2004: 19). 
Perhaps violence has become an important facet of Afghan political life, and thus, by extension, Afghan 
masculinity.  This  possibility  may be  further  reinforced  by the  reality  that  other  traditional  methods  of 
asserting  masculinity  are  either  absent  or  restricted  in  the  Afghan  context.  Although  it  is  generally 
accepted that  remasculinisation through traditional  methods such as education or  employment  is  not 
benign – in that it often results in pushing women out of the workforce, marginalising them in education 
and asserting control over the female body – it  is possible that reasserting masculinity through these 
means may not result  in the excessive physical violence which may possibly ensue if  these methods 
remain unavailable. 
Asserting Masculinity through Violence & its Effects on Women’s Rights
I argue that as a consequence of employment, familial relationships and education being severely 
restricted or virtually unavailable to Afghan men, and because power and authority have traditionally been 
exercised through the use of violence, men in Afghanistan will resort to violence in order to assert their 
masculinity.  As a result of Afghanistan’s violent history, and because Afghan society accepts a hegemonic 
model of masculinity that affirms the dominance of men by subordinating women, masculine violence will 
express itself in two key ways; through the perpetration of violence on the bodies of Afghan women in the 
private sphere, and through the use of violence as a political tool in the public sphere.  Since the self-
identity of men has become fractured within the home, and because the majority of men (particularly those 
residing in rural areas) are in effect prohibited from participating in political life, the private sphere can 
definitely  be considered the most  important  arena within  which this  crisis  in  identity and attempts at 
remasculinisation will be reconciled. As human rights groups filter into Afghanistan, and women’s rights 
are more readily defended in the public sphere, the home is the only domain in which men can, and will, 
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institute traditional Afghan models of hegemonic masculinity, one in which women are often considered 
subordinate, and where female behaviour relates directly to social status and male honour.
Tocquevillian  philosophy  has  posited  that  there  is  a  correlation  between  honour  and  violence, 
claiming that a propensity for violence increases with the need to defend one’s honour, and is usually 
fuelled by feelings of insecurity (Tocqueville, 1863: 281).  He found that when honour was “at the zenith of 
its power, its rules are at their strangest, apparently the further they are from common sense, the better 
they  are  obeyed.”  (Dearinger,  2004:  26).   Based  on  the  Tocquevillian  model,  male  honour  can  be 
resuscitated through the use of  violence.  Such violence, at least within the private sphere, will  most 
probably be directed at the target that is believed to have caused the greatest breakdown of paternalistic 
honour within the family unit: the woman.  Punishment and brutalisation of women that contravene gender 
norms, can serve the purpose of reaffirming male honour and reasserting one’s masculinity within the 
family unit through the subordination and inferiorisation of the female – a practice that most Afghan men 
have grown accustomed to because it is deeply embedded in their patriarchal culture.
In her article on Afghan cultural heritage and national identity, Dupree argues that Afghan identity has 
historically been and continues to be centred on the notion of protecting the homeland against foreign 
occupation and threats (Dupree, 2002: 978).  Additionally, Dupree also mentions how the emergence of 
fanaticism and the creation of an atmosphere of intolerance and oppression have caused the deepest 
resentment  among Afghans.   It  is  commonly believed that  the imposition  of  radical  views of  Islamic 
morality on the Afghan people was a practice that the Taliban achieved with help from forces outside the 
country itself (Dupree, 2002: 980). The practices of the Taliban further cement the deep resentment that 
Afghans have towards foreign forces attempting to control the political life within their country. Considering 
that much of Afghanistan’s history has converged around the need to prevent foreign invasion, and taking 
into  account  that  protecting  the  homeland  has  become an  important  facet  of  national  identity  which 
bridges the ethnic and tribal divides within the country, participation in political life will become extremely 
important as Afghanistan moves towards greater democracy.  As a result, it is reasonable to expect that 
Afghan men will utilise the political sphere, an area that has too often been the cause of their distress and 
oppression, as a means by which to assert greater power and authority. Among much of the elite, active 
participation and authority in the public sphere define the essence of manhood in Afghan culture.
History  provides  many  examples  by  which  masculinity  has  been  articulated  through  the  state 
(Haywood and Mac an Ghaill, 2003: 53).  Articulation of masculinity through the state generally involves 
practices  that  are  linked  to  national  identity,  cultural  belonging  and  citizenship.  Contemporary  media 
images have developed modern expressions of masculinity through status apparatuses taking the form of 
“fundamentalisms, ethno-nationalisms and ethnic cleansing.” (Haywood and Mac an Ghaill,  2003: 53). 
Liberal conceptions of the state designate it as “an impartial adjudicator between competing interests, for 
example, between men and women, and hence as a legitimate source of power and means of violence.” 
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(Haywood and Mac an  Ghaill,  2003:  53).   However,  it  is  important  to  note  that  throughout  much of 
Afghanistan’s violent history, the majority of the conflict that has plagued the country has been the result of 
extremist rejection of the legitimacy of a bona fide state apparatus (Revolutionary Association of Women 
of  Afghanistan,  2000).7 Much  of  the  historical  violence  in  Afghanistan  has  been  the  product  of 
fundamentalist  groups refusing to comply with  the authority of  the state.  It  would  seem imprudent  to 
believe that this may no longer be a real and probable possibility in post-conflict Afghanistan.
Foreign occupation continues to pose real threats for collective masculinisation by means of political 
participation and involvement in the public sphere.  Attempts by foreign occupiers to control fanaticism in 
Afghanistan have resulted in Afghan men being further emasculated and depicted as unable to exercise 
control over their state and people. Through the processes of Othering (Said, 1978)8 used by the West, 
Afghanistan’s population is erroneously depicted as uncivilised and incapable of managing and governing 
themselves  (Stabile,  2005:  766).  Human  agency  continues  to  be  restricted,  and  the  inability  of  the 
population to structure and produce their own state institutions without interference from foreign forces 
further erodes their conceptions of masculinity.  Therefore, for the elites that do, in fact, have access to the 
public sphere, their ability to exercise power and authority, and thereby assert their masculinity, is severely 
restricted by foreign pressure and occupation.
The West, however, continues to feel that their intrusion in Afghanistan is only aimed at assisting the 
country’s transition to democracy.  There is a common conviction among most Western aid organisations 
and States that are participating in ‘keeping peace in Afghanistan’ that truly altruistic objectives lie at the 
heart  of  their  actions.  In their  minds,  foreign occupation is necessary in order to develop sustainable 
economic and social infrastructures within the transitioning country.  There exists a deep-rooted Western 
belief that “keeping people busy with economic activities [will] divert their violent capabilities” (Cramer and 
Goodhand, 2003:  133).   As Cramer and Goodhand (2003) note,  this  is also a common rhetoric  that 
pervades post-conflict  reconstruction,  whereby theorists  claim that  economic  development  will  play a 
significant role in consolidating peace.  Economics in post-conflict Afghanistan proves to be problematic in 
relation to this belief. 
Two decades of violence have left Afghanistan on the brink of economic failure – “State institutions 
were [left] dysfunctional, and the society and economy fragmented” (United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime, 2002: 21).  A large part of Afghanistan’s economy depends on the cultivation of opium. Although 
President Karzai has issued an official ban on the production of opium, the provinces that produce 93% of 
the total poppy production in the country disregard the ban (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 
7 When the Taliban took control in Afghanistan they executed the former Communist Leader, Dr. Najibullah along with 
his four brothers. Any opposition to the rule of Taliban faced swift execution, often exercised in public spaces for all to 
bear witness. 
8 Orientalism,  Said’s  influential  piece  about  how the  West  attempts  to  control  the  East  by  attributing  to  them 
characteristics that are often inferiorising, describes in depth the practice of Othering as a means by which to render 
the East more comprehensible and manageable. 
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2002: 6).  Economic restructuring and development in Afghanistan is severely hindered by the fact that 
much of the poppy production is handled and managed by regional warlords, who use violence and fear to 
erect  order  and control  the population (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2002:  12).9 Such 
instances seem to suggest that violence is still a very prominent aspect of how power is exercised within 
Afghan society.  Furthermore, the fact that non-state sanctioned violence, initiated by warlords, is seen as 
largely successful, in that it has been successful in controlling much of the population outside the major 
centres, there may be increased feelings of hopelessness among the rural population, particularly men, as 
warlords have now replaced the Taliban in instilling constant and continual fear among Afghans. Despite 
the fact that the Taliban are no longer in power, the oppression of Afghan men remains, and threats to 
their masculinity have yet to cease.  In these sorts of circumstances, masculinity cannot effectively be 
asserted in the public sphere, or at least not as easily as it can be in the private sphere.
Since the majority of the rural population will probably have little opportunity to participate actively in 
political life, as politics in Afghanistan has often been the confined to the elites living in the major centres 
in Afghanistan, and because political life in the rural areas is largely dominated by regional warlords, men 
in rural areas will most probably assert their masculinity through methods that are more readily accessible. 
In the face of poverty, lack of employment, deplorable living conditions, absence of educative institutions, 
the breakdown of the family unit, it seems probable that remasculinisation in post-conflict Afghanistan, at 
least among those men that have little access to political life, will mostly occur within the home. Since 
violence has historically been perceived as a viable means through which to exercise power and authority, 
I argue that attempts at remasculinisation within the private sphere will manifest itself through violence 
directed at the most readily available targets – women and children.
Popular  resistance  to  endowing  women  with  equal  rights  to  those  of  men  has  been  common 
throughout  Afghan history.   Although politicisation of  women’s  rights was evident  from the nineteenth 
century, when Amir Abd al-Rahman Khan ruled Afghanistan, when King Amanullah attempted to liberate 
women  by  enforcing  Western  norms  upon  Afghan  society,  violent  opposition  ensued  and  led  to  the 
implementation of more conservative measures (Abirafeh, 2007).  History has demonstrated that episodes 
of violence and conflict have occurred every time a ruler or government attempts to emancipate Afghan 
women (Abirafeh, 2007).  After more than a century of similar efforts to liberate women, and subsequent 
violent backlash, it is likely that contemporary efforts may produce the much the same results.  Essentially, 
it is highly unlikely that human rights organisations can suddenly impose values of women’s rights and 
equality upon a society that has traditionally illustrated an aversion to these sorts of ideas.  This is not to 
insinuate that women’s rights can never become appreciated or respected in Afghanistan – but that any 
arbitrary and sudden imposition of these values may only be seen as suspect by a society that has every 
9 Warlords taxed opium farmers on the total amount of opium sold in return for protection in provinces controlled by 
these warlords. 
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reason to be cynical of foreign interventions and intrusions into the social and political life of their country.  
In fact, despite the increased influx of humanitarian organisations and women’s rights groups that 
have flooded the country, respect for the rights of women is still  very much absent in Afghan society. 
According to Amnesty International, discriminatory practices institutionalised in Afghanistan preceding and 
during the war have not disappeared, and in some cases have grown stronger (Amnesty International, 
2005; Abirafeh, 2007: 120).  It  is common for Afghan women to become targets of domestic violence. 
Remasculinisation within the family unit expresses itself in the treatment of women as property; hence, 
forced and child marriages are still prevalent within Afghan society (United Nations News Centre, 2005). 
Male masculinity is further reinforced as a predominately male police force disregards and dismisses 
female complaints of domestic violence (Abirafeh, 2007: 121).  It is, thus, common for Afghan women to 
claim that they felt more protected while the Taliban were in power (Abirafeh, 2007: 122); and as such, 
these patterns of violence can be seen as associated with post-conflict remasculinisation, more so than 
remnants of Talibanic culture.  Abirafeh states that these new patterns of excessive violence directed at 
females  may  be  the  result  of  years  of  frustration,  trauma,  and  economic  hardship  that  male  family 
members were made to endure under the Taliban regime (Abirafeh, 2007: 122). 
Masculinising violence can present countless problems for the protection of women in Afghanistan. 
First, with the absence of a state apparatus through which violence can be mitigated, non-state sanctioned 
violence will promote the development of male-centred transitional justice processes.  Essentially, those 
aspects of justice that are the most important to women will be disregarded.  This may include designating 
issues  of  discrimination,  domination,  and  improvement  of  physical,  social  and  legal  security,  as 
unimportant; while issues of electoral or governmental arrangements and divisions of territory are given 
primary importance (Bell and O’Rourke, 2007: 25). According to Bell and O’Rourke (2007: 25), allowing 
male biases to have increased influence at the negotiating table during transitional justice will only result in 
women transforming from “pawns of war” to “pawns of peace”, with little change in their overall power in 
relation to men within the context of transitional justice processes.  
In addition, deteriorating safety in the home presents impediments to Afghan women’s full enjoyment 
of their human rights (United Nations Economic and Social Council, 2004; Abirafeh, 2007: 121).  Afghan 
men and women differently characterise violence in the private sphere. The majority of Afghan men rarely 
describe violence that occurs within the context of intimacy as ‘violence’. Additionally, the routinisation of 
such violence has resulted in women thinking that domestic violence is within the boundaries of normal 
gender relations and thus should not be considered an abuse of women’s human rights (Abirafeh, 2007: 
121).   Amnesty  international  indicates  that  most  Afghan  women  consider  violence  to  be  a  normal 
occurrence in the course of their lives (Abirafeh, 2007: 121).  In order to safeguard male honour and 
masculinity, female violence is often denied by and within the family.  The invisibility of domestic violence 
is further facilitated by the social stigma that is attached to its existence, which discourages women from 
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actively  speaking out  against  it  (Abirafeh,  2007:  121).   Hence,  much  of  the male-instigated  violence 
against women has and will continue to take place with impunity.  Furthermore, both Afghan men and 
women perceive this violence as being within a model of masculinity that has come to be widely accepted 
and normalised. 
Lastly,  although  the  presence  of  international  organisations  centred  on  the  protection  of  Afghan 
women are integral to the safeguarding of women’s rights, the fact that they seem to be more actively 
promoting the job security  of  women over  men – in  a  society  which  possesses  a  strong patriarchal 
structure and hierarchically organises men above women – can be detrimental to the overall safety of 
Afghan women. Afghan society adopts a hegemonic masculinity model where men are principal wage 
earners,  and the fact  that  employment for women is more readily secured than employment for men 
disrupts this delicate balance between gender roles in this society.  Therefore, it is likely that the liberal 
model that is espoused by the West may not be the most promising to secure peace and stability in 
Afghanistan. Hence, human rights organisations need to rethink their mode of assistance, and need to 
structure their aid in a way that causes little disruption to the organisation of gender roles within the host 
society without  compromising the human rights of  Afghan women. It  is  possible that this may not be 
entirely feasible, as ensuring that women’s rights gain prominence and command respect will certainly 
disrupt  the  culturally  idealised  conceptions  of  gender  roles  currently  adopted  by  Afghan  society. 
Nonetheless, aid organisations must ensure that they do not overlook the significance of the roles that 
men generally occupy within this traditionally patriarchal society.  In order to ensure the continued security 
of women, attention also needs to be directed at helping men recover from the protracted conflict that has 
plagued the region. This may be achieved by directing resources to the development of educative and 
employment  institutions  and  the  transfer  of  power  to  men  as  ‘heads  of  household’.  Although  aid 
organisations must persist in ensuring that women’s rights continue to be respected during this transition 
process what must be recognised is that the renegotiation of gender roles may need to occur gradually 
over a period of time. It is likely that any immediate reconstitution of gender roles may further inflame the 
crisis in masculinity that  Afghan men are already undergoing.  It  is  very possible that  these traditional 
institutions of asserting masculinity may not develop in a manner that is identical to the West – in that 
women may still be subordinate to men within familial relationships and men may still be the sole wage 
earners – but in a society that has always been extremely patriarchal this sort of development can be seen 
as somewhat expected.  This is,  of  course, not  to say that  women should be eternally restricted from 
participating  in  the  public  sphere  or  from  attaining  a  status  equal  to  that  of  men.  However,  such 
developments can still be seen as somewhat beneficial as they may reduce some women’s experiences 
of violence. 
As Afghanistan attempts to  resuscitate itself  after  nearly two decades of  continuous conflict  and 
turmoil,  the absence or restricted presence of traditional institutions by which masculinity can be non-
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violently asserted has resulted in masculinity being achieved through the use of violence. This violence 
has expressed itself  within the public  domain predominately by non-state actors  attempting to assert 
power over rural populations, and has also expressed itself within the private domain, as violence against 
women. Although numerous studies have concluded that females are generally absent from transitional 
justice  processes,  post-conflict  masculinisation  provides  but  one  forum by  which  scholars  can  more 
thoroughly evaluate the effects of transitional justice processes on the women residing in that particular 
region  of  the  world.  Within  the  context  of  Afghanistan,  studies  of  remasculinisation  can  offer  a  new 
perspective on how women’s rights may be hindered by the reconstruction process as men attempt to 
reclaim their ‘manhood’ after experiences of longstanding conflict. 
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